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CYBER-SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND THE COVID-19
ATTENUATION?

Vincent J. Samar*
“[G]overnment of the people, by the people, and for the people shall
not perish from the earth.”
––Abraham Lincoln1
Large-scale data brokers collect massive amounts of highly personal consumer
information to be sold to whoever will pay their price, even at the expense of
sacrificing individual privacy and autonomy in the process. In this Article, I will
show how a proper understanding and justification for a right to privacy, in context
to both protecting private acts and safeguarding information and states of affairs for
the performance of such acts, provides a necessary background framework for
imposing legal restrictions on such collections. This problem, which has already
gained some attention in literature, now becomes even more worrisome, as
government itself becomes a consumer of this information to fight off a domestic
instantiation of the global Covid-19 pandemic. This Article proposes some definite
ways in which the courts and Congress might limit both the private sector and the
government’s use of such data to ensure individual autonomy will not be sacrificed.

*
Vincent J. Samar is a Lecturer in Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago, an Associate Faculty Member
in the Graduate School, and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago Law School. He is the
author of Justifying Judgment: Practicing Law and Philosophy, The Right to Privacy, as well as more than thirtyfive articles, mostly in law reviews, covering a wide range of issues related to legal and human rights. He has
authored three book chapters and is the editor of The Gay Rights Movement, a compilation of articles from the
New York Times. The author would like to thank Professor Thomas Derdak of the Loyola University Chicago
Philosophy Department for suggesting that the author might have something to say on the important topic of
privacy in the context of cyber-security. The author also thanks Professor Mark Strasser of Capital University
Law School for his very helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article.
1
Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
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INTRODUCTION
How successful we, as a people, are at achieving a government that is truly
“of the people” will depend in great part on our ability to know our own interests and
our ability to act on them based on our own reflections. Humans appear to have this
capacity of being autonomous insofar as we are able to generate options, deliberate
on which option is best, and then stick to what we decide.2 Should this capacity be
lost, humans may no longer conceive of themselves as engaged in self-rule, and any
government they are a part of will no longer be thought of as being “of the people.”
Of course, self-rule does not always reduce to being just able to act on one’s own
interests and desires. In cases where the very nature of our ability to act would be
undercut, what appears as a personal choice may need to be temporarily set aside.
But even where this is the case, it must be because our autonomy itself is in jeopardy
of being undermined because the apparent personal choice of the individual is not
really a personal choice of hers, but a highly sophisticated manipulation of her
interests and desires originating from outside herself.
Recent developments in the field of cyber-technology allow large private
companies called “data brokers” to gather a wide range of personal information about
individuals’ desires and wants, larger than even what would be gathered by
2
Much disagreement exists regarding whether humans have free will. See, e.g., Stephen Cave, Free Will
Exists
and
Is
Measurable,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
10,
2016,
9:45
AM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/06/free-will-exists-and-is-measurable/486551/; Nicholas Clairmont,
There’s No Such Thing as Free Will and Determinism, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2016, 6:35 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/06/free-will-exists-and-is-measurable/486551/. A classic view on this
issue is found in Immanuel Kant’s discussion of free will as connected with individual autonomy. According
to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Kant’s basic idea can be grasped intuitively by analogy with the idea of political
freedom as autonomy. Consider how political freedom in liberal theories is thought to be
related to legitimate political authority: A state is free when its citizens are bound only by
laws in some sense of their own making—created and put into effect, say, by vote or by
elected representatives. The laws of that state then express the will of the citizens who
are bound by them. The idea, then, is that the source of legitimate political authority is
not external to its citizens, but internal to them, internal to “the will of the people.” It is
because the body politic created and enacted these laws for itself that it can be bound by
them. An autonomous state is thus one in which the authority of its laws is in the will of
the people in that state, rather than in the will of a people external to that state, as when
one state imposes laws on another during occupation or colonization. In the latter case,
the laws have no legitimate authority over those citizens. In a similar fashion, we may
think of a person as free when bound only by her own will and not by the will of another.
Her actions then express her own will and not the will of someone or something else. The
authority of the principles binding her will is then also not external to her will. It comes
from the fact that she willed them. So autonomy, when applied to an individual, ensures
that the source of the authority of the principles that bind her is in her own will. Kant’s
view can be seen as the view that the moral law is just such a principle. Hence, the “moral
legitimacy” of the [Categorical Imperative] is grounded in its being an expression of each
person’s own rational will. It is because each person’s own reason is the legislator and
executor of the moral law that it is authoritative for her.
Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (citations omitted),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#Aut (last updated July 7, 2016).
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companies such as Google and Facebook. These data brokers usually gather this
information without the individual’s knowledge, only to sell that information to other
companies and users who will use it to target products, services, or solicit political or
other actions.3 A recent report by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)4 states
that the nine largest data brokers are:
Acxiom, CoreLogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou,
Rapleaf and Recorded Future[, and they] obtain and share vast amounts of
consumer information, typically behind the scenes, without consumer
knowledge. Data brokers sell this information for marketing campaigns
and fraud prevention, among other purposes. Although consumers benefit
from data broker practices which, for example, help enable consumers to
find and enjoy the products and services they prefer, data broker practices
also raise privacy concerns.5

Such companies pose a serious threat to individual autonomy and democracy when
they are able to learn through “private commercial mechanisms of information
capture, production, analysis and sales” more about those they surveil than may be
known even by the people who are the targets of their surveillance.6 In such
circumstances, there is a real danger that individuals will be induced to act on
interests, not necessarily of their own choosing, but that of those who use the
information obtained to manipulate, or even manufacture, wants of their own. In such
cases, individual freedom is lost if the behavior of the persons so affected no longer
represents their own interests and desires, but those of some possibly unknown
source. That threat becomes even more problematic if government gets involved in
trying to influence people without their knowledge by co-opting the information
gathered by the private sector in an effort to affect what individuals believe and how
they vote or behave, beyond what may have started out as a legitimate governmental
need for the information.
In the past, the right to privacy, which encompasses the right to gather
information helpful in determining what to believe and how to act, provided a means
for protection against this sort of threat, but that protection is now itself in danger of
being lost or enfeebled by mechanisms of how information is gathered, as well as
who is gathering the information.7 If the way information is now gathered and by
whom no longer guarantees that privacy will be protected, the result will be a loss of
3
Leo Mirani & Max Nisen, The Nine Companies That Know More About You Than Google or Facebook,
QUARTZ (May 27, 2014), https://qz.com/213900/the-nine-companies-that-know-more-about-you-than-googleor-facebook/. See also FTC Recommends Congress Require the Data Broker Industry to be More Transparent
and Give Consumers Greater Control Over Their Personal Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 27, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-brokerindustry-be-more?utm_source=govdelivery.
4
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3.
5
Id.
6
Shoshana Zuboff, You Are Now Remotely Controlled: Surveillance Capitalists Control the Scientists, the
Secrets
and
the
Truth,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/opinion/sunday/surveillance-capitalism.html.
7
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (acknowledging for the first time in dicta a constitutional
[non-Fourth Amendment] right to informational privacy).
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personal autonomy brought about because the private sector is inadequately regulated
in the way it gathers information. And that loss of autonomy will not just occur in
the private sector but will likely percolate into the public arena as well, especially if
government officials, who may have their own agendas, become involved in
accessing the information. The latter may occur initially very benignly when such
officials or agencies react to a legitimate need for information to protect against a
current crisis, like by tracking the movements of people to halt the spread of the novel
coronavirus (“Covid-19”). But it can very quickly be fitted into other areas, if the
barriers to its escalation are not well laid out.
This Article will describe some of the problems associated with maintaining
individual autonomy in general, given new ways technology is used to support data
collection methods, and how a more robust protection of individual privacy both by
way of legislation and by court decisions might provide a defense. Especially of
concern will be to protect against the use of private data to manipulate individual
wants and desires so as to undermine a full appreciation of the background
considerations to choices, especially when directed to the performance of private acts
and participation in democratic institutions. It will also concern itself with protecting
against benign and legitimate uses by government of underregulated information,
which themselves could pose a threat to individual autonomy in the long run. The
Article will draw on a theory of how privacy might be understood and applied in court
decisions and legislation, as a background to ensuring individual autonomy is not
undermined.
Section I will review a recent New York Times column that identifies types
of manipulations commercial data collecting mechanisms can produce, as well as how
they are used by companies to manufacture consumer behavior. It will also concern
itself with how information collected by commercial data collecting companies is
being sought by state and federal officials to help stall the spread of Covid-19.
Section II will review how, by examining prior English and American case law and
scholarly articles, the understanding of legal privacy in the United States evolved to
affirm protections for private acts and states of affairs, the latter focusing on
information and places, both of which are essential to assure real participation in
democratic institutions. Section III will put forth a justification for the legal right to
privacy, grounded in human autonomy, and notes how protecting private states of
affairs guarantees both the protection of private acts and participation in democratic
institutions. Section IV will follow with an application of what the background theory
for privacy provides, first by articulating a strategy for resolving conflicts of rights
involving privacy and state assertions of a compelling interest. Following that, this
Section will consider how cyber-privacy concerns might be more fully protected in
the future if legislation is introduced to afford greater authority to the FTC to produce
regulations assuring the protection of personal information, as the technology
continues to advance and government’s need for personal information continues to
rise. A brief conclusion will follow, emphasizing the vigilance needed to protect
individual autonomy.

5
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MANIPULATIONS OF COMMERCIAL DATA TO MANUFACTURE CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR AND HOW THAT GETS TRANSFERRED TO PREVENT THE SPREAD
OF COVID-19

In a very concerning article in the New York Times, prior to the recent Covid-19
pandemic, Shoshana Zuboff warned that those of us who shop, connect, explore,
research, or do just about anything on the internet are being remotely controlled not
only in what we know, but in what can be learned about us.8 That information is
further substantiated by the aforementioned FTC report on the nine largest data
collection companies that gather tremendous amounts of personal data on nearly
every U.S citizen and then sell that personal data, without a great deal of transparency,
to whoever will pay the price. According to the FTC report:
• Data brokers collect consumer data from extensive online and
offline sources, largely without consumers’ knowledge, ranging
from consumer purchase data, social media activity, warranty
registrations, magazine subscriptions, religious and political
affiliations, and other details of consumers’ everyday lives.
• Consumer data often passes through multiple layers of data
brokers sharing data with each other. In fact, seven of the nine
data brokers in the Commission study had shared information
with another data broker in the study.
• Data brokers combine online and offline data to market to
consumers online.
• Data brokers combine and analyze data about consumers to
make inferences about them, including potentially sensitive
inferences such as those related to ethnicity, income, religion,
political leanings, age, and health conditions.
Potentially
sensitive categories from the study are “Urban Scramble” and
“Mobile Mixers,” both of which include a high concentration of
Latinos and African Americans with low incomes. The
category “Rural Everlasting” includes single men and women
over age sixty-six with “low educational attainment and low net
worths.” Other potentially sensitive categories include healthrelated topics or conditions, such as pregnancy, diabetes, and
high cholesterol.
• Many of the purposes for which data brokers collect and use
data pose risks to consumers, such as unanticipated uses of the
data. For example, a category like “Biker Enthusiasts” could be
used to offer discounts on motorcycles to a consumer, but could
also be used by an insurance provider as a sign of risky
behavior.

8

Zuboff, supra note 6.
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•

Some data brokers unnecessarily store data about consumers
indefinitely, which may create security risks.
• To the extent data brokers currently offer consumers choices
about their data, the choices are largely invisible and
incomplete. 9
Such gatherings of so much personal information on individual U.S. consumers
creates a serious knowledge gap between those in the industry that have the
information and the persons whom the information is about. This gap in knowledge
creates what Zuboff describes as an:
Epistemic inequality [that] is not based on what we can earn but rather on
what we can learn. It is defined as unequal access to learning imposed by
private commercial mechanisms of information capture, production,
analysis and sales. It is best exemplified in the fast-growing abyss between
what we can know and what is known about us.10

Zuboff claims that “[t]he new centrality of epistemic inequality signals a power shift
from the ownership of the means of production, which defined the politics of the 20th
century to the ownership of the production of meaning.”11 As she describes it:
It isn’t only what you post online, but whether you use exclamation points
or the color saturation of your photos; not just where you walk but the stoop
of your shoulders; not just the identity of your face but the emotional states
conveyed by your “microexpressions”; not just what you like but the pattern
of likes across engagements.12

9

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3.
Zuboff, supra note 6.
11
Id.
12
Id. Some states have already started restricting private entities, but not government entities, from
gathering “biometric” information, mostly for the purpose of identity protection. See, e.g., Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008). In Illinois, the restrictions on gathering of
“‘[b]iometric information’ means any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared,
based on an individual's biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2010).
“Biometric identifiers” in Illinois are those physical features that “are biologically unique to the individual” such
that “once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to
withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008). Illinois law identifies
the following biometric identifiers:
[A] retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.
Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs,
human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data,
tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, or eye
color.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2010). Not “include[d are] biological materials regulated under the Genetic
Information Privacy Act” nor “information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information
collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.” Id. Additionally, Illinois does not include under biometric
identifiers “an X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan, mammography, or other image
or film of the human anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical condition or to
further validate scientific testing or screening.” Id. Still, despite Illinois’ efforts to restrict biometric information
that can give rise to identity theft, more needs to be done nationally to also limit opportunities for manipulation
of individual behavior that might otherwise go unnoticed.
10
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Another example she notes of this epistemic inequality and its use in altering
individual behavior was found when:
The Australian exposed [Facebook’s] interest in applying “psychological
insights” from “internal Facebook data” to modify user behavior. The
targets were 6.4 million young Australians and New Zealanders. “By
monitoring posts, pictures, interactions and internet activity in real time,”
the executives wrote, “Facebook can work out when young people feel
‘stressed,’ ‘defeated,’ ‘overwhelmed,’ ‘anxious,’ ‘nervous,’ ‘stupid,’
‘silly,’ ‘useless,’ and a ‘failure.’” This depth of information, they
explained, allows Facebook to pinpoint the time frame during which a
young person needs a “confidence boost” and is most vulnerable to a
specific configuration of subliminal cues and triggers. The data are then
used to match each emotional phase with appropriate ad messaging for
maximum probability of guaranteed sales.13

This shift in power from industrial capitalism (often marked by large,
multinational corporations’ ownership of the means of production) to what Zuboff
describes as “ownership of the production of meaning” challenges even governmental
control over populations that previously was seen as supported by the means of
production.14 This may be responsible for a rise in government efforts to become
more inclined to adopt similar technological means, when the opportunity permits, as
a way to also regain lost authority against the growing and largely amorphous private
sector of industry giants.15
The thrust of Zuboff’s article also reaffirms the civil libertarian’s concern
that this new and growing surveillance reality presents “an unprecedented threat to
individual freedom.”16 In reference to that threat, Zuboff writes:

13
Zuboff, supra note 6 (quoting Facebook Targets ‘Insecure’ Kids, THE AUSTRALIAN (May 2017),
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/facebook-targetsinsecure-young-people-to-sell-ads/newsstory/a89949ad016eee7d7a61c3c30c909fa6.).
14
Id. Karl Marx argued that society’s superstructure, including its ideology, politics, norms, religion,
philosophy, education, art, family, culture, and science emerges from and is shaped and maintained by its base,
the means of production, including the relations of production that means establish, which for modern Western
democratic societies is capitalism. See Nicki Lisa Cole, Definition of Base and Superstructure: Core Concepts
of Marxist Theory, THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-base-andsuperstructure-3026372. Moreover, as the superstructure becomes established, it, in turn, legitimizes and
maintains the base that gives it rise. See id.
15
See Nigel Barber, Social Networks Challenge Government: Democratic Government is Challenged by
the Internet on Two Fronts, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/thehuman-beast/201804/social-networks-challenge-government (pointing to both terror networks and Silicon
Valley, illustrated by the Arab Spring, “and the widespread use of Twitter to organize protests”). Indeed,
President Trump’s use of Twitter to reshape the presidency might be seen as a way to enlist a similar process in
service to his own political purposes. See Michael D. Shear et. al., How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in
Over
11,000
Tweets,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html.
16
Zuboff, supra note 6 (quoting John M. Broder, F.T.C. Opens Hearings on Computers’ Threat to Privacy
and Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/11/us/ftc-opens-hearings-oncomputers-threat-to-privacy-and-liberty.html?searchResultPosition=34).
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Early on, it was discovered that, unknown to users, even data
freely given harbors rich predictive signals, a surplus that is more than what
is required for service improvement. . . .
The data are conveyed through complex supply chains of devices,
tracking and monitoring software, and ecosystems of apps and companies
that specialize in niche data flows captured in secret. For example, testing
by [t]he Wall Street Journal showed that Facebook receives heart rate data
from the Instant Heart Rate: HR Monitor, menstrual cycle data from the Flo
Period & Ovulation Tracker, and data that revealed interest in real estate
properties from Realtor.com—all of it without user knowledge.17

What this New York Times column so pointedly perceived as a danger to
individual autonomy becomes even more momentous given the outbreak of Covid19, which has forced a large segment of the workforce to hibernate in their homes,
doing whatever work they can online.18 Indeed, because it is reasonable to expect
that even after the virus eventually comes under control and people no longer suffer
remaining at home, much of normal work life will have converted into an online
modus vivendi.19 This being likely, it becomes even more concerning that individual
privacy be protected from the additional opportunities this will provide data collectors
to gather information and their potential purchasers to use the information to affect
consumer behavior in this new internet work environment.20
Currently, several software companies are developing programs to track cell
phone users to see if they are complying with “stay-at-home” orders.21 Even more
significantly, several state governments are encouraging this development and
making use of this service in order to try to get a better handle on how the Covid-19

17

Id.
Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, the number of people working from home had already increased.
U.S. census data indicates that the number of workers working from home in 2017 was 5.2%, or approximately
eight million people. That number was up from 5% in 2016 and 3.3% in 2000. See Dan Kopf, Slowly but Surely
Working from Home is Becoming More Common, QUARTZ AT WORK (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://qz.com/work/1392302/more-than-5-of-americans-now-work-from-home-new-statistics-show/.
A
Gallup survey had shown that those who work remotely at least part of the time was up from 39% in 2010 to
43% in 2016. See Annemarie Mann & Amy Adkins, America’s Coming Workplace: Home Alone, GALLUP
(Mar.
15,
2017),
https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/206033/america-coming-workplace-homealone.aspx?utm_source=link_wwwv9&amp;utm_campaign=item_236222&amp;utm_medium=copy.
19
See Catherine Thorbecke, As Coronavirus Spreads in the US, Employers Gear Up for Massive WorkFrom-Home Experiment: Experts Share Tips on How to Stay Afloat and Operational Amid an Outbreak, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/coronavirus-spreads-us-employers-gearmassive-work-home/story?id=69282662.
20
It is interesting to note that given the prevalence of cloud computing and evidence for ordinary criminal
investigations being increasingly held in servers in different countries, the U.S. and other foreign governments
have had to confront privacy concerns, when sharing personal information, which for the U.S. fall under the
Fourth Amendment, See Peter Swire & Justin Hemmings, Overcoming Constitutional Objections to the CLOUD
Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/overcomingconstitutional-objections-to-the-cloud-act-2/.
21
See Geoffrey A. Fower, Smartphone Data Reveal Which Americans Are Social Distancing (and not),
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/24/social-distancingmaps-cellphone-location/.
18
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virus is spreading, so its spread can be halted.22 Obviously, in this period of a global
pandemic that so far has taken 2,174,702 lives worldwide23 and over 419,827 lives in
the United States alone,24 with the further expectation that these numbers will be
increasing in the U.S. to over 500,000, government efforts to halt the spread of this
disease would appear to be a compelling interest.25 And, no doubt, courts, if asked to
consider the privacy of individuals when considering these matters, will likely uphold
the state’s compelling interest to gain whatever information is needed to halt the
spread of this disease.26
Where the issue of protecting individual privacy and liberty really takes hold,
now that government itself is getting into the act of accessing highly personal
consumer information, is what happens after the Covid-19 threat is eliminated.
Certainly, there are those in the government and the private sector who will want to
keep available this tracking information. Obviously, many private businesses may
find it helpful to identify markets where they might sell their products.27 But beyond
those private commercial interests is the likely government interest, both federal and
state, to track those who might be suspected of criminal activity or, more urgently,
those who might be involved in a terrorist plot.28 Additionally, one can easily
22
See Hollie Silverman, New Mexico Using Cell Phone Data to Create Social Distancing Models and
Considering
More
Restrictive
Travel
Measures,
CNN
(Apr.
10,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/us/new-mexico-cell-phone-data-track-residents/index.html. Although the
U.S. government has, as yet, not used cell phones “to enforce stay-at-home orders or track patients,” it is engaged
“in talks with Facebook, Google and other tech companies about using anonymous location data to combat the
coronavirus, including tracking whether people are keeping at safe distances from one another.” Fower, supra
note 21; see also Tony Romm et. al., U.S. Government, Tech Industry Discussing Ways to Use Smartphone
Location
Data
to
Combat
Coronavirus,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-coronavirus/.
23
Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021).
24
CDC COVID Data Tracker: Maps, Charts, and Data Provided by the CDC, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021).
25
See Susannah Luthi, U.S. on Pace to Pass 100,000 Covid-19 Deaths by June 1, 2020, CDC Director
Says: This Marks the First Time Robert Redfield Has Explicitly Addressed the Grim Milestone, POLITCO (May
15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/us-on-pace-to-pass-100-000-covid-19-deaths-by-june-1cdc-director-says-261468.
A “compelling interest” has been described as follows:
A compelling state (or governmental) interest is an element of the strict scrutiny test
by which courts exercise judicial review of legislative and executive branch enactments
that effect constitutional rights, such as those found in the First Amendment.
An interest is compelling when it is essential or necessary rather than a matter of
choice, preference, or discretion.
Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest.
27
See Haris Bacic, Become a Data Genius: Track Everything in Your Small Business, FORBES (June 20,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/06/20/become-a-data-genius-track-everything-in-yoursmall-business/#4d6d10748797.
28
See Editorial, The Government Uses ‘Near Perfect Surveillance’ Data on Americans: Congressional
Hearings are Urgently Needed to Address Location Tracking, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/opinion/dhs-cell-phone-tracking.html. In an e-mail from U.S. Senator
Richard J. Durbin to Vincent J. Samar, dated July 17, 2020, it is noted that “we have seen a worrying trend of
companies like Clearview Al scraping photographs from social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, and
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understand, once this information becomes readily available, the government’s
concern to have access to it in order to plan for the next pandemic that might pose an
even graver infection threat to the country.29 In addition to the traditional Fourth
Amendment concerns this poses with respect to law enforcement, there is the concern
that this information may be used to track political dissent and other forms of legal
anti-government activity.
That said, commercial interference with personal privacy should not be all
that surprising. The twentieth-century economist John Kenneth Galbraith, in a nowfamous article entitled The Dependence Effect, written long before the development
of the internet, identified how commercial interference with personal privacy and
liberty was already taking place back in the 1950s.30 Then, he wrote that human
“wants are dependent on production.”31 “As a society becomes increasingly affluent,
wants are increasingly created by the process by which they are satisfied. This may
operate passively. Increases in consumption, the counterpart of increases in
production, act by suggestion or emulation to create wants.”32 Galbraith’s point was
to declare what was already known, the “more direct link between production and
wants [that] is provided by the institutions of modern advertising and
salesmanship.”33 As to that link, Galbraith writes, any “businessman and the lay
reader will be puzzled over the emphasis which I give to a seemingly obvious point.”34
But if Galbraith’s concern was real back in the 1950s, then all the more should his
concern be applied to the way today’s private commercial mechanisms of information
gathering and information sale operate to control our needs and wants by offering us
products to attend to them. If producers can, through the use of various private
mechanisms of information technology, learn of an individual’s developing wants and
desires, perhaps even before the individual himself has become aware of them, then
the likelihood of individuals being shuffled down a specific path toward satisfying
their wants, without a chance to fully appreciate which wants are worth satisfying and
amassing databases of Americans who have no idea that their photographs are in a facial recognition database
for law enforcement use.” E-mail from Senator Richard J. Durbin to Vincent Samar (July 17, 2020, 1:50 PM
EST) (on file with author). That same e-mail also expressed concerns “about overuse or misuse of this
technology, given that few laws or court rulings have established guidelines or boundaries on when or where
this technology can or should be used.” Id. It noted that “[f]acial recognition technology had been found to be
far less accurate when analyzing the faces of women or people of color.” Id. And that following the death of
George Floyd, “[m]any expressed concern that law enforcement agencies could use facial recognition
technology to identify who participated in these peaceful protests.” Id.
29
Currently,
[i]n seeking to battle the coronavirus, the U.S. government is not seeking to collect
and maintain a database of Americans’ whereabouts, sources cautioned. Rather, U.S.
officials have asked whether companies’ vast stores of geolocation data might help
epidemiologists spot trends, including vulnerable populations, or identify areas at risk,
such as hospitals under strain, two people said.
Romm et al., supra note 22.
30
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Dependence Effect, in THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 126 (40th Anniversary ed.,
1998).
31
Id. at 126, 129.
32
Id. at 131.
33
Id. at 129.
34
Id. at 130.
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by how much, is greatly increased. This is where human freedom and individual
privacy become most at risk.
As a consequence of this concern, some may wish for an earlier time where
such personal interference by use of technology with a person’s private life was not
possible. But even aside from the fact that we cannot turn back the clock, it remains
doubtful that we should want to. The above discussion of information mechanisms
following where people travel or what they might desire has legitimate uses, as the
social distance tracking involved in responding to the coronavirus teaches. Where
society fails is not with regard to allowing such legitimate uses, but with failing to
provide the equally important attention needed to contain such uses only to their
legitimate purposes. The genie may be out of the bottle, but the space in which the
genie is allowed to operate should be controlled. Proper use of laws to protect basic
privacy rights is essential if society is to continue to evolve technologically while still
remaining democratic. So, it is to the privacy side of this equation, what it means and
how it is justified, that we must now turn.
II. PRIVACY AND THE LAW
Our current discussion of privacy and technological intrusions needs to be
clarified. How exactly does technology intrude on privacy? Does it only potentially
threaten private information? Might private acts be involved? Additionally, what is
a private act? How does information about one’s wants, desires, current
psychological state, or places one visits on websites implicate not only private
information, but private acts as well? Together, answering these questions should
unravel at least some of the more obvious concerns commercial-informationgathering technology places on the performance of private acts. More importantly, it
should provide a framework for how questions about information gathering should
get decided. The previous Section expressed a concern over the clandestine use of
personal information to affect private behavior. The next Section will show how the
protection of private acts is logically, if not temporally, prior to protecting autonomy.
Given this arrangement, the discussion here will first focus on making sense of what
is meant by a private act and its prudential connection to private information and
places.
Ultimately, this arrangement hopes to show how private acts describe a basic
liberty at the core of our concern for protecting individual autonomy. A concern
closely related to protecting private acts is protecting private information and states
of affairs, which turns out to be prudentially necessary for private acts to occur.
Because performance of private actions can be attenuated when too much personal
information is made generally available, limits are needed on just how much personal
information should legally be available for use in influencing private behavior. Such
limits are also needed to offset potential illegal uses, even in contexts where
government legitimately seeks to gain information from private sector data banks to
respond to a global pandemic. So, let us begin by first stating what is meant by a
private act.
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The definition that will be put forth is derived from an analysis of how cases
arising in the Fourth Amendment,35 tort,36 and constitutional areas of the law appear
to overlap.37 This is important because the privacy right to be offered is broader than
what any one area of the law would recognize. Early understandings that gave rise to
the Fourth Amendment (such as reasonable expectations of privacy),38 the tort area
35
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62–63 (1967) (striking down a New York statute that would allow an
ex parte order for eavesdropping if there were a reasonable belief that it might produce evidence of a crime);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that an FBI wiretap of a phone booth was subject to
Fourth Amendment protections). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz introduces the idea of a
“reasonable expectation” of privacy, which occurs with regard to what might be overheard when the glass door
of a phone booth is shut. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36
In an important article on tort privacy, Professor William Prosser identifies the following four areas of
tort privacy questions, sometimes giving rise to constitutional questions when the government acts to promote
or restrain common law privacy torts:
(1) Regarding seclusion and solitude, see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626
(1951), which allowed a municipality to ban commercial solicitations at private residences on the
basis of “the living right of [people] to privacy [in the sense of being left alone] and repose.” See
also Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (holding that the privacy of bus
passengers was violated because busses carried FM receivers, which broadcast music, news, and
sometimes commercial advertising).
(2) Regarding the reporting of embarrassing private facts, see Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (allowing a former prostitute who had been involved in a murder trial to
sue when, seven years after her acquittal and after she had made new life for herself, a movie, The
Red Kimono, was made depicting her earlier life). Contra Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940) (upholding the First Amendment right of the New
Yorker magazine to report on an infant prodigy who intentionally disappeared from public life
because the matter was of public interest).
(3) Regarding being placed in a false light in the public eye, see Lord Byron v. Johnson, 35
Eng. Rep. 851 (1816), in which the court held fixing Byron’s name to a poem he did not write was
actionable. But see Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 (1967) (holding Life magazine’s publication
of a story falsely depicting the infliction of violence on the Hill family taken as hostages by three
escaped convicts was not actionable because it was not published “with knowledge of [its] falsity or
in reckless disregard of the truth”). Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, noted that “[s]uch
privacy as a person normally has ceases when his life has ceased to be private.” Id. at 401 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
(4) Regarding the appropriation of a person’s name or likeness, see Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), superseded by statute, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51
(McKinney 2020), as recognized in Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.E.3d 389
(N.Y. 2018). Following a ruling in favor of the defendant, after a woman’s likeness had been made
to adorn a package of Flour of the Family without her permission, the New York legislature passed
a statute affording privacy protection from commercial exploitation.
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
37
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute that prohibited married
couples from using contraceptives and doctors from advising on their use violated a constitutional right to
privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a constitutional right to privacy extends to
unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a constitutional right to privacy includes a
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before the third trimester); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (holding that a constitutional right to privacy extends to minors to purchase contraceptives);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that state criminal laws prohibiting same-sex consensual
intimacy in the home violate basic interests in constitutional privacy and intimacy under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
38
Long before the Fourth Amendment came into existence was the Magna Carta provision providing, “[n]o
freeman shall be taken or (and) imprisoned and diseased or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon
him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or (and) by the law of the land.” SAMUEL
E. THORNE ET AL., THE GREAT CHARTER: FOUR ESSAYS ON MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY
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(including seclusion and solitude, not having embarrassing facts disseminated, not
being placed in a false light, or having one’s likeness exploited for commercial
purposes),39 and constitutional privacy (involving intimate decisions)40 are well
known. The overlap is found in the fact that issues of privacy in all three of these
areas of the law assert a claim to negative freedom in the sense of “the self-to-be-letalone”41 but must also be “self-regarding,” in the sense that no other person’s basic
interest is involved.42 This is an important background recognition in uniting the three
areas, for, on their own, the Fourth Amendment and tort areas are more related to
privacy of information, whereas the constitutional area (other than Fourth
Amendment criminal procedure) is more related to intimate actions that the
government has little business in preventing. Additionally, privacy claims under the
Fourth Amendment and other constitutional areas are against the government, since
the Constitution and Bill of Rights only pose restrictions on the government, whereas
tort privacy claims involve civil actions between individual persons or groups.43 As
an assurance that any claim to privacy will not be open to wide speculation about just
how another’s interest may be affected, it is necessary to impose a requirement that
the mere description of the act “without the inclusion of any additional facts or causal
theories” would not suggest a conflict with any other person’s interest.44 This
requirement is necessary to ensure the definition will stand on its own, establishing a
prima facie case prior to any additional evidence being brought forth to show the
privacy claim should be overridden in a particular case. One other factor that needs
to be considered concerns the possible range of the interest involved. Obviously, if
the idea of an “interest” is left too open-ended, the possibility arises that no action

132 (1965). See also Semayne’s Case (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) (holding that, absent prior notice of the
sheriff’s arrival, a joint tenant can refuse an attempted execution on the personal property of the decedent
judgment-holder).
39
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
(providing the foundation for recognizing a tort right to privacy).
40
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), Justice Brandeis dissented with a statement far broader than the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues the
case turned on. Brandeis wrote:
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope. The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life
are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized men.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41
VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1991).
42
Id. at 65–67.
43
A tort is “a civil wrong or wrongful act, whether intentional or accidental, from which injury occurs to
another.”
Tort,
THE
PEOPLE’S
LAW
DICTIONARY
(emphasis
added),
https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2137 (last visited 1/1/21).
44
SAMAR, supra note 41, at 67.
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might ever be considered private.45 Thus, to have a meaningful definition of a private
act, the interests it must affect are limited to only basic interests in freedom and wellbeing. This is necessary to ensure that the scope of the interest involved is not
overbroad but restricted to only encompass such basic concerns, which, on the
freedom side, include “freedom of expression, privacy, freedom of thought, worship”
and, on the well-being side, are “life, health, physical integrity (as in not being
assaulted), and mental equilibrium (as in not be subject to mental harassment).”46
Such interests are separate from any derivative concerns that presuppose conceptions
“about facts or social conventions.”47 The latter could undermine the notion of a
private act if not segregated out by making the very idea of a private act open to
challenge by others who might have a derivate interest in the outcome. Thus,
adjusting for these concerns, a definition of a private act emerges. That definition
states, “[a]n action is self-regarding (private) with respect to a group of other actors
if and only if the consequences of the act impinge in the first instance on the basic
interests of the actor and not on the interests of the specified class of actors.”48
What is also interesting to note about the definition is that it is a relational
definition. That is to say, what may be private between one group of people may not
be private if a different group were involved. Whether I wear a toupee, for example,
would not likely be private to my immediate family but should, all else being equal,
be private to the IRS.49 By the same token, what my income was last year may be
private as regards certain family members but certainly not private to the IRS.
Consequently, in making a privacy claim, it is necessary to specify the particular
group the claim is being applied to. Additionally, it is necessary to limit the meaning
of “in the first instance” in the definition to only what a “mere description of the act”
would entail, when confined to only basic interests. This will provide the basis for
when a claim to an act being private can be plausibly set forth. It does not, however,
explain why the law should care about protecting private acts, nor does it provide the
conditions under which a private act might be intruded upon. That would require a
justification for a right to privacy separate from any understanding of its meaning.
Before addressing that issue, however, it should be helpful to also explain more
precisely what is meant by private “states of affairs,” which include both information
and places, and how this area of privacy law relates to private actions. In the case of
privacy of information and places, a corollary definition to the first reads: “[a] state
of affairs is private with respect to a group of other actors if and only if there is a

45
See id. at 66. For example, if a person had an interest in never having to see a red stop sign because
seeing red stop signs made them sick in the stomach, the placement of a red stop sign outside the home would
violate the person’s privacy right to freely travel where one wanted to.
46
Id. at 68.
47
Id. “An example of a derivative interest [on the well-being side] is to receive a good education,” since
the interest combines “the basic interest in well-being . . . with the factual conception that one’s well-being will
be benefited by education.” Id. On the freedom side, “being allowed to marry is derivative of the basic interest
in freedom combined with the social convention of marriage.” Id.
48
Id. (emphasis in original).
49
See id. at 64–65.
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convention, recognized by members of the group, that defines, protects, preserves, or
guards that state of affairs for the performance of private acts.”50
Here a state of affairs might include limiting the availability and use of
information only to a limited number of people, as well as to provide a convention
for determining the places where private acts might be performed. What is
particularly interesting to note about this second definition is how it is connected to
private acts. It is saying that private states of affairs provide for the possibility of
private acts occurring. This will need further explanation below. For the moment,
one notes that the second definition, unlike the first, is culturally relative in the sense
that a convention will need to be recognized by members of the relevant group to
protect the state of affairs for the performance of private acts. That convention could
be simply the closing of shutters to one’s windows or of a glass door on a phone booth
(as in the past), the locking away of papers, or adopting certain notices or behaviors
to signal that confidentiality is expected. As will be explained, societies that seek to
protect private acts will find it necessary to set out a set of conventions to limit the
availability of information about private acts and prevent intrusion into places where
they may occur.
Why should it be necessary to protect certain states of affairs as private in
order for private acts to be practicable? The problem here is one of psychology.51
People are often intimidated by what others may learn about them.52 The intimidation
may assume many forms, from public disagreement with what one plans to do, to
challenges to one’s beliefs, to attacks on one’s thinking process and personal choices
as being immoral, irreligious, or possibly illegal. In short, protection of private states
50

Id. at 73. (emphasis in original).
A recent article that appeared on NBC’s website notes:
Psychology says that part of human nature’s default mode is to be social. One
theory: people have an innate (and very powerful) need to belong. Some key arguments
(published in the journal Psychological Bulletin in 1995) [present] evidence that shows
most people make social ties under most conditions—and most people try to avoid
breaking those ties if they can.
Sarah DiGiulio, In Good Company: Why We Need Other People to be Happy, NBC NEWS: BETTER HEALTH
(Jan. 9, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/good-company-why-we-need-other-peoplebe-happy-ncna836106. The article goes on to point out that a strong social network allows our brains to work
better and tends to give people a longer lifespan. But the article then goes on to warn:
The exception is when a relationship’s negatives outshine its benefits. Be wary if a
relationship encourages bad habits or causes distress, says Debra Umberson, PhD,
Professor of Sociology and Director of the Population Research Center at the University
of Texas at Austin. “A bad relationship is worse than no relationship when it comes to
health.”
Id.
52
Even in situations where the psychological effect may be thought to be benign or in service
to a good cause, it should not be dismissed.
The psychological effect of being watched by others has been proven a powerful
tool in boosting honest or charitable behaviors while reducing dishonest behaviors. This
watching effect increases self-awareness and causes individual[s] to consciously modify
their behavior to increase compliance with social standards.
Jiaxin Yu et al., Being Watched by Others Inhibits the Effect of Emotional Arousal on Inhibitory
Control,
FRONTIERS
IN
PSYCH.
(Jan.
20,
2015)
(citations
omitted),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4299288/.
51
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of affairs turns out to be indirectly connected to the protection of an individual’s
autonomy, self-identity, and well-being.53 One does not have to reach very far into
the history of the United States to find examples where individual autonomy might
have been constrained when hotly contested viewpoints were debated, such as
occurred over abolishing slavery,54 affording women the right to vote,55 providing
equality of opportunity to racial minorities,56 and granting equal liberty to same-sex
couples to marry.57 Human nature is such that people are concerned with how they
are viewed by relatives, friends, neighbors, and other members of society.58 If that
concern has no boundaries, the effect may very well be to constrain individual
autonomy. Additionally, democratic societies in particular stand to lose if “the
permanent interests of man as a progressive being”59 could be undercut by adverse
public opinion, where such society’s interests in controlling individual autonomy may
be, at most, only indirect,60 and where such adverse public opinion would undermine
an individual’s ability to figure out what really is in her own best interests.
53

In a 2009 report by the Institute of Medicine, it is noted that:
There are a variety of reasons for placing a high value on protecting the privacy,
confidentiality, and security of health information. Some theorists depict privacy as a
basic human good or right with intrinsic value. They see privacy as being objectively
valuable in itself, as an essential component of human well-being. They believe that
respecting privacy (and autonomy) is a form of recognition of the attributes that give
humans their moral uniqueness.
The more common view is that privacy is valuable because it facilitates or
promotes other fundamental values, including ideals of personhood such as:
•
Personal autonomy (the ability to make personal decisions)
•
Individuality
•
Respect
•
Dignity and worth as human beings
INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH
RESEARCH
77
(Sharyl
J.
Nass
et
al.
eds.,
2009)
(citations
omitted),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9579/.
54
See 1832 Speech Given in the House of Delegates Regarding Abolition, THE HISTORY ENGINE,
https://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/3883 (last visited May 17, 2020).
55
See JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting Right, 5
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1994).
56
See The Civil Rights Movement and the Second Reconstruction, 1945–1968, HISTORY, ART &
ARCHIVES:
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-andPublications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Civil-Rights-Movement/ (last visited May 17, 2020).
57
See Murray Dry, The Same-Sex Marriage Controversy and American Constitutionalism: Lessons
Regarding Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and Individual Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 275 (2014).
58
In Politics, Aristotle remarks, “[M]an is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by
mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity . . . .” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin
Jowett trans., 2009), http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html. Psychologists talk about the need to belong
as influencing human behavior and motivation. See Kendra Cherry, How the Need to Belong Influences Human
Behavior and Motivation, VERYWELL MIND (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-the-needto-belong-2795393.
59
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 264 (Max
Lerner ed., 1961). Although Mill was a utilitarian, he stated that “it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded
on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.” Id.
60
See id. at 265, where Mill acknowledges that:
[t]here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual,
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and

17

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 47:1]

Since this article is focused on cyber-security and privacy, the reader might
be inclined at this point to consider how protecting human autonomy by protecting
privacy relates, by analogy, to shielding the core processor of a computer from being
infected by malware or the human brain from being subject only to indoctrinating
propaganda without any allowance for critical thinking. The goal of the protection is
not to disallow information from being considered by either the processor or the mind
but, in the case of the human mind, because it has the capacity to deliberate, it is to
ensure that any consideration of the information’s merits is critically evaluated.61
Were such limits not imposed, the choices even of the human mind, like the results
put forth by the processor, may very little reflect the purposes animating its use.
Even if, when deliberating over whether to adopt a particular belief or set of
beliefs, the person’s choice turns out to be faulty (leaving aside how that would be
measured), there would still be a major loss to autonomy if the person was not allowed
to discover this error for herself by critical thinking on her own. This is not to say
that the purpose of protecting private states of affairs should be to allow people to do
wrongful actions or to exclude others from helping them consider relevant
information. Nor is it to say that engaging others in thinking through a problem may
not add significantly to the process of deliberation. It is to say that the process of
determining how one’s own life goes forward, including what policies one will
support or beliefs one will hold, should not be constrained from outside, unless there
is a clear indication that harm to others will occur. For indeed, if people did not have
a space to determine their own beliefs regarding how to live their own lives, society
itself would suffer the real harm of being unsure in whose interest it was operating.
As is shown by social influence studies, individuals do not always just follow the
group but sometimes actually do evaluate the information they are presented, and
when they do, depending on their strength of will, may be in a better position to make
up their own mind and be a part of a democratic process that upholds individual rights
and affirms the authority of the law.62 Especially should this be true when the matter
conduct which affects only himself, or if it affects others, only with their free, voluntary,
and undeceived consent and participation.
61
Christine Korsgaard makes an important point in discussing how the human mind operates as a source
of normativity. In her book, The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard writes:
[O]ur capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities [something
Korsgaard claims other animals do not do] is also a capacity to distance ourselves from
them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse
to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain
distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I
believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a
powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have
a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem.
Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for
perception and desire, not as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it
reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward.
CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 93 (1996).
62
See, e.g., Anahad O’Connor, The Struggle for Iraq: Psychology; Pressure to Go Along with Abuse Is
Strong, but Some Soldiers Find Strength to Refuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/14/world/struggle-for-iraq-psychology-pressure-go-along-with-abusestrong-but-some.html.
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affects their own immediate health or well-being or the health and well-being of those
whom they most care about.63 None of this is meant to suggest how an individual
should necessarily approach deciding what is the best way to carry on their private
lives. But before one may decide to join or take a position in the public arena, on an
issue of private or public concern, she needs the security of knowing, while in the
formulating stage of her thinking, that her willingness to deliberate on the issue will
not be opened up to public ridicule. The old aphorism “it is no one else’s business”
operates in such cases to afford the social distance necessary for one to make up one’s
own mind unhampered by what others might think.64
Having specified two significant definitions of “privacy” for legal purposes,
it is important to state more fully how they might operate to decide a legal case. The
definition of “private state of affairs” operates both in the Fourth Amendment area
and the torts area, depending on whether the claim being brought is against another
person as in the torts area or presents a legitimate challenge to the police power of the
state under the Fourth Amendment. In both cases, the first question that will need to
be resolved is whether there existed, at the time of the challenged act, a socially
recognized convention creating a zone of privacy that “defines, protects, preserves,
or guards that state of affairs for the performance of private acts.”65 Referencing
society here, rather than the law, as the place where such conventions might arise
allows for zones of privacy to accommodate changes in technology before being
recognized by the law in much the same way that new kinds of ownership for
intangible goods gave rise to the legal recognition of patents, copyrights, trademarks,
and trade secrets.66 In this respect, society and not law should be the original source
of conventions that identify what information gets recognized as private.
With regard to private acts, if the claim is that a seemingly legal prohibition
in a state or federal statute, regulation, or executive order violates an individual’s
constitutional right to privacy, the first challenge will be to show that the
government’s characterization of the prohibited action reveals an infringement of
either a basic interest in freedom, including of expression, privacy, thought, worship,
etc., or a basic interest in well-being, including life, physical integrity, and mental
equilibrium.67 This result, of course, will require that no additional facts or social
conventions be discretely made part of the interest so described as to convert it from
a basic into a derivative interest. Were the latter to become the norm, no prima facie
63
See generally JEREMIAH J. GARRETSON, THE PATH TO GAY RIGHTS: HOW ACTIVISM AND COMING OUT
CHANGED PUBLIC OPINION 6–7 (2018) (ebook) (arguing that “exposure to lesbians and gays was the defining
factor that has caused distinctive change on gay rights attitudes as compared to other issues—the theory of
affective liberalization”).
64
No One Else’s Business, REVERSO DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.reverso.net/englishdefinition/no+one+else%27s+business (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).
65
See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 73.
66
See Rich Stim, Overview of Intellectual Property Laws, STANFORD UNIV. LIBRARIES,
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/introduction/intellectual-property-laws/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020);
Michael J. Formica, Why We Care About What Other People Think of Us, PSYCH. TODAY (Dec. 31, 2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/enlightened-living/201412/why-we-care-about-what-other-peoplethink-us.
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See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 67–68.
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claim for privacy protection would ever be secure since the government could always
stretch the definition of an interest to extend beyond the well-recognized categories
of basic interests.68 However, an exception to this rule might arise if the government
were successful at convincing the Supreme Court of the United States that the current
understanding of private acts falls outside the scope of protections that had been
previously deemed worthy of constitutional protection.69 In such a circumstance, the
constitutional right to privacy for private acts would be called into question and so
would the background analysis being presented here. So, the question of whether a
right to privacy for private acts is properly grounded in a constitutional value needs
now to be considered.
III.

JUSTIFYING A LEGAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Thus far, this Article has described serious privacy concerns arising from an
“unequal access to learning” personal individual information created by “private
commercial mechanisms of information capture, production, analysis and sales.”70
The Article has pointedly acknowledged the dominance over aspects of consumers’
personal liberty and privacy that the private sector of the economy maintains by the
use of this technology. It has also recognized an even greater threat to individual
privacy and personal liberty, as state (and maybe the federal) governments begin to
draw upon the massive amount of data collected by data brokers to fight a global war
against the Covid-19 pandemic.71 Currently, there are over 101, 087,195 confirmed
cases of the virus worldwide and the number of deaths worldwide is 2,174,702.72 But
these numbers change substantially every day. In the United States alone, as of
January 27, 2021, the reported number of cases of Covid-19 infections is 25,172,433
and the number of deaths is 419,827.73 What these numbers attest to is the likely need
68

See id.
This is because the Constitution was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) to afford the Supreme Court the sole power of judicial review as to what the Constitution
means and whether acts of Congress comport with it. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
[I]f a law be in opposition to the [C]onstitution; if both the law and the [C]onstitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to
the law, disregarding the [C]onstitution; or conformably to the [C]onstitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the
[C]onstitution; and the [C]onstitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
[C]onstitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Id. at 178.
70
Zuboff, supra note 6.
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See Covid-19: People: How Governments Are Using Personal Data to Fight Covid-19 (UK), HERBERT
SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/covid-19-people-howgovernments-are-using-personal-data-to-fight-covid-19-uk; see also FAQ: Data and Surveillance, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/coviddata/faq-surveillance.html.
72
Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/?
utm_campaign=homeAdvegas1?%22%20%5Cl%20%22countries (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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U.S. Covid-19 Cases and Deaths by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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to continue gathering information at least until this pandemic comes under control.
But even if that becomes true in the next several months as various vaccines become
available, decision-makers will likely want to plan for the next pandemic or crisis. If
they do, they will likely still want access to the information contained in data banks,
and the private sector will likely want to continue gathering information to create new
markets, even after Covid-19 is swept into the dustbin of history. Additionally, this
Article has articulated a framework drawn from prior case law in the United States
for understanding the concept of privacy as engaging two separate, but interrelated,
ideas: the notion of a private act and the idea of a private state of affairs. Before,
however, we can proceed to use this information to suggest what might be done to
protect individual privacy and liberty in the present and future, we need to make
explicit the normative foundation for concluding that a robust right to privacy should
be found to exist as part of American law. It is to justify just such a right to privacy
in American law that we now turn.
The justification for a right to privacy can be located in human autonomy as
a value widely shared both in the United States and much of Western Europe.74 And
while there is certainly evidence that some other cultures value autonomy, it should
not be thought that valuing autonomy is just a culturally relative phenomenon. For
every moral theory to be prescriptive presupposes that the persons it addresses are
free agents, and so autonomy must be an important baseline for any moral theory to
operate.75 Indeed, there has been much literature on the value of autonomy in moral
theory, and although the question of a more universal construction need not concern
us here,76 autonomy is a centrally important value in such highly influential moral
theories as those of Immanuel Kant, J.S. Mill (in his discussion of self-regarding
goods), and Alan Gewirth.77 Furthermore, although there are different ways
74
Mahmut Alpertunga Kara, Applicability of the Principle of Respect for Autonomy: The Perspective of
Turkey, J. MED. ETHICS 627 (2007) (“The concept of autonomy is a manifestation of Western culture, which
emphasizes individualism, personal happiness and self‐actualization. In this context, ‘personhood’ is viewed
from the perspective of autonomy and individual rights.” (citing Charles Olweny, The Ethics and Conduct of
Cross‐Cultural Research in Developing Countries, PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 3:11–20 (1994))).
75
See ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 16–17, 138 (1978).
76
I do not mean to suggest that there may not be other justifications for autonomy not contingent on a
society’s existing beliefs. But for purposes of treating American law, I need not go this further step toward a
universal human rights justification. See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 205–08.
77
For a broader understanding of the role autonomy plays in moral and political philosophy, including the
important role of autonomy to Kant and Mill, see generally Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 28, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/.
Alan Gewirth acknowledges the importance of autonomy when he distinguishes rational autonomy as having
two senses, a broad sense and a strict sense. See GEWIRTH, supra note 75, at 138. In the broad sense, every
person sets his or her own laws or principles of conduct. See id. Here, autonomy will not mean that one will
always act in a manner consistent with liberal tradition. Id. In the strict sense, it means that the principles “one
chooses for oneself will have been arrived at by a correct use of reason, including true beliefs and valid
inferences.” Id. Laws properly made should impose no intrusion on this. “For the rational agent views the law
[here meaning the justified moral law] not as something imposed on him from without but rather as something
he imposes on himself . . . .” Id. at 303. Gewirth’s understanding of human autonomy is consistent with human
dignity. His idea is “that human beings possess a special value intrinsic to their humanity and as such are worthy
of respect simply because they are human beings.” Human Dignity, CTR. BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY,
https://cbhd.org/category/issues/human-dignity (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).
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autonomy might be understood, common among all of them is that it is “directed by
considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one's authentic
self.”78 For our purposes, I shall follow the more baseline etymological description
for ‘autonomy’ that derives “from the Greek roots auto meaning ‘self’ and nomos
meaning ‘custom’ or ‘law.’”79 This reflects both “the political sense of the word” in
terms of “a group's right to self-government or self-rule” as well as the more common
usage of independent control.80 Indeed, autonomy allows for the recognition of moral
and cultural values in society, even in cases where the law has not afforded them
recognition.81
So, starting with this understanding of autonomy, which seems certainly
consistent with our earlier discussion of the concept of privacy, we can now say that
if a society values autonomy, it must certainly value protection of private acts. For
these represent actions undertaken where no other rights or basic interests are
involved. But our definition of a private act does more than just make clear the way
that privacy is related to autonomy; it opens the door to an understanding of why
private acts need to be protected. If a society values autonomy in the sense of selfrule, it must assign equal value to private actions, as they constitute the ideal case
examples for valuing autonomy. That is because, under the definition posited above,
such actions are “self-regarding” in that no other person’s basic interest (outside the
relevant group) are intruded upon. This description also helps to make sense of the
reason put forth earlier that absent a court’s determination that the action is not
protected, it should be thought, prima facie, as one which the Constitution should
rightly protect.82 Especially this is true if the action is one that the Supreme Court
78
79

STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 77.
Autonomy, VOCABULARY.COM, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/autonomy (last visited Apr. 26,

2020).

80

Id.
Consider, for example, jury nullification. Jury nullification “occurs when a jury returns a verdict of ‘Not
Guilty’ despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law
that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding.”
Doug
Linder,
Jury
Nullification,
UMKC
SCH.
OF
L.
(2001),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html.
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It has been noted that:
The Supreme Court does not use the phrase "personal autonomy" very often. Unlike
privacy, it is not a fundamental right. As such, it is still a very limited concept regarding
its impact on legal jurisprudence.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the Court emphasized the impact that Roe
v. Wade (1973) had on the importance of personal autonomy, especially with regard to
reproductive rights. The Casey Court wrote, "[I]f Roe is seen as stating a rule of personal
autonomy . . . [then the Supreme Court's] post-Roe decisions accord with Roe's view that
a State's interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of
individual liberty claims . . .
[N]o erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's central
holding a doctrinal remnant."
In Washington v. Glucksberg (1997)[,] however, the Court appeared to oppose the
concept that personal autonomy creates personal protections for individuals. "And
although Casey recognized that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due
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should find necessary to the preservation of the democratic order that has as its end
the promotion of individual autonomy, then clearly it should be protected. The reason
for saying an end of the democratic order is protection of individual autonomy will
be made clear below.
As was also earlier explained, a private state of affairs presupposes the
presence of recognized conventions for identifying the information covered as private
or the place designated as one where performance of a private action should be
allowed. Along with that understanding is why we are even concerned with
protecting information and places. It was earlier noted that human beings are affected
because of their social nature by what other people think about them, whether or not
they should be so affected.83 This can easily give rise, if a person’s private activities
are brought into a public spotlight, to cause him to refrain from performing actions
that may cause him ridicule, even in circumstances where the actions may have
assisted him toward developing a greater understanding of himself or the decisions
he is making.84 Obviously, it has to be reasonably undeniable that the actions do not
harm any non-consenting person outside the relevant group, if the protection is to be
maintained. All this is to say that a society which views private actions as worthy of
protection, because they represent ideal case examples of human autonomy (a priori),
must also value the protection of information and places without which such private
acts would be unlikely to occur (a posteriori).85 Granted the latter protection may be
the product of our human need for social acceptance and the costs that sometimes
arise from failure to gain acceptance; still, as this need is widespread throughout
society, it should not be easily dismissed. Certainly, there are points where people
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, it does not follow that any and all important,
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected. Casey did not suggest otherwise.”
Personal Autonomy, LEGAL INFO. INST. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal_autonomy (last
visited May 21, 2020) (first quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835, 860 (1992);
and then quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 518 U.S. 1057 (1996)).
Evidently, while the final significance of a right to personal autonomy may be far from certain,
there is reason to believe it is becoming a more central value focus of the law. Note, for example,
the Court’s statements in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015):
Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in
a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices. Yet
while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved
(physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.
The Court’s Obergefell decision clearly limited the scope of the Glucksberg decision while
expanding the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s conception of liberty to include samesex marriage even though same-sex marriage, unlike marriage, was not part of a long-standing
tradition as recognized in Glucksberg.
83
Cass Sunstein notes how:
[s]ocial influences can lead people to go quite rapidly in identifiable directions,
often as a result of ‘cascade’ effects, involving either the spread of information (whether
true or false) or growing peer pressure. Sometimes cascade effects are highly localized
and lead members of particular groups, quite rationally, to believe or do something that
members of other groups, also quite rationally, find to be silly or worse.
CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 16 (2001).
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See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 100–01.
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need to overcome the need for acceptance, as in the case of joining a violent gang,
but such cases are best set aside as unworthy of privacy protection when nonconsented-to violence is clearly present or may be inferred to be present because there
is evidence of serious immaturity or the intellectual inability to understand what is
expected. Otherwise, people can fall into the trap of always just following the status
quo without affording much thought to why this should be the case.
A final point for this Section relates to the connection between privacy of
information and places and participation in democratic society. The first thing to note
is that being allowed to participate in governmental decision-making customarily
takes place in representative republics by electing those who will make decisions for
the society.86 Use of the popular vote might be thought to be the foundation of a
democratic society and certainly is justified under an autonomy principle meant to
affirm citizens’ right to decide who are best to fill positions in the government. But
here one must be cautious. Societies like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(“DPRK or “North Korea”), the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of
Cuba may all make use of a ballot box, but if there is no real opposition to the party
in power when choosing the candidate, let alone any real opposing points of view to
governmental policies and laws publicly disseminated, the effect will not be to further
the citizens’ ability to choose the person they believe is best for the position but, more
accurately, to merely rubber stamp the candidate the party has already chosen for
them.87 In such circumstances, it cannot be said that individual citizenship autonomy
is affirmed, notwithstanding the procedural nicety of the vote, and one would have to
conclude that such a practice cannot satisfy valuing autonomy generally absent a real
opportunity for changing the system. I point this out because the way the concern for
protecting autonomy in democratic decision-making might be met is to guarantee
privacy of information and provide citizens the space to figure out what their interests
are so that when they do vote, they will be voting based on their own interests.88 This
86
In his book Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Professor John Hart Ely argues for a
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review that attempts to resolve the two paragraphs of the nowfamous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) concerning popular
control and egalitarianism by focusing on process. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). He argues that “a system of equal participation in the processes of
government is by no means self-evidently linked to a system of presumptively equal participation in the benefits
and costs that process guarantees; in many ways it seems calculated to produce just the opposite effect.” Id. at
77. In essence, Professor Ely argues that courts should opt to preserve majority government while at the same
time preserving minority rights by ensuring real participation in the democratic process. In regard to privacy
specifically, he notes the “Fourth Amendment can be seen as another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause,
concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in treatment.” Id. at 97.
87
See North Koreans Vote in “No Choice” Parliamentary Elections, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47492747; Party Tricks: Cuba’s Communists Bar “Alternative”
Candidates from Local Elections: How the Castro Regime Keeps Serious Challenges Off the Ballots, THE
ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2017/11/23/cubas-communists-baralternative-candidates-from-local-elections. China is more complex. Under Article 97 of the Constitution for
the Peoples Republic of China, competitive elections of People’s Congresses at various levels are allowed.
However, “[t]hese elections are still dominated and controlled by the [Chinese Communist Party], which firmly
upholds the one-party rule and allows only one official ideology.” Jie Chen & Yang Zhong, Why Do People
Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?, 64 J. POL. 178, 178–89 (2002).
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See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 95.
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is why earlier I noted that protecting individual autonomy (in this case the privacy of
information and places) needs be an end of democratic government. Thus, the claim
that democratic governments should affirm autonomy as an end is based on the idea
that citizens will need sufficient privacy of information and places to determine what
persons, polices, and laws truly represent their views.89 So, there is clearly an internal
arrangement between democratic process and privacy of information and places that
must be present to guarantee that the resulting social order is truly grounded in valuing
autonomy. In the next section, I will take up how best to satisfy autonomy in the
context of resolving conflicts between a privacy right’s protection and protections
afforded by other rights. I will also consider the case where not a right but a
compelling state interest is involved and how a court might resolve that sort of
conflict.
IV. APPLYING THE LEGAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS AND COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
A conflict of rights involving privacy occurs when a prima facie claim to
privacy conflicts with another active right that is also necessary to fostering individual
autonomy. Such rights “are those that permit the holder of the right to perform an
action, such as making a speech [including the gathering of public information],
publishing a news report, or practicing a particular religious belief.”90 In each of these
instances there is an implied claim to negative freedom in the sense of the self-to-belet-alone. This implied claim justifies the right being grounded in autonomy and
allows autonomy to operate as the common denominator for deciding among the right
claims which one will dominate. In such cases, “any conflict between two or more
active rights should be resolvable on the basis of which right better promotes
autonomy in general.”91 Put another way, the “determination should be based on
which action is most likely to promote the autonomy of all persons who stand in the
same relation,” reflecting the relational nature of a privacy claim.92
This approach, however, will only work for conflicts among active rights
where both rights can be found to support autonomy. Passive rights, by contrast, are
those that afford the rights’ holder “a benefit, such as trial by his or her peers, a speedy
and public trial, the right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of witnesses,
and the right to the assistance of counsel.”93 Consequently, when an actor performs
89
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Id. at 104.
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Id. at 107.
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Id. at 108.
93
Id. at 104. Passive rights are best thought of as interests that “are intrapersonal in the sense that they
represent specific benefits due the holder, rather than an unspecified freedom to act.” Id. at 105. “Active rights
are signaled by statements of the form ‘A has a right to φ’[where A is the rights holder and B is the respondent];
while passive rights are signaled by statements of the form ‘A has a right that B φ’ (in both of these formulas,
“φ” is an active verb).”
Rights, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Rev. ed 2020),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/ (last visited 1/1/21).
90
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an action that impinges a passive right, “the conclusion has to be (at least where the
interest is a basic interest) that between the two parties involved that there is no valid
claim to privacy.” This follows from the definition of a private act. 94 Thus, in the
Fourth Amendment area where autonomy would normally support protecting the
selective disclosure of information to protect private actions, a privacy right will not
be recognized if there is probable cause to believe another’s basic interest (e.g., life
or physical integrity) might be at stake. Similarly, in tort law, certain kinds of
intrusions are allowed and not considered violations of privacy if they are consented
to because individual autonomy would be undermined if such intrusions were not
allowed. For example, “cases allowing reasonable investigations into a person’s
credit status can be explained in terms of an explicit consent that is rendered on
applying for credit. However, the situation becomes more troublesome when
companies that receive these reports, then attempt to sell or give the information to
others without the applicant’s permission.”95 In that case, an active rights conflict
arises between the credit company, which wants to sell information for profit, and the
credit applicant, who wants the information to remain private. When this situation
occurs, autonomy is best served by restrictions on the release of information obtained
solely for the purpose of supporting a credit application.
In the context of a compelling state interest, the concern is not over which
interests foster maximal autonomy but whether the state’s interest “is more
fundamental to fostering autonomy than [it] is [to] protecting privacy.”96 Here I will
focus on the government’s interest in stopping the spread of Covid-19, as it presents
a broad range of privacy concerns that implicate cyber-security and other matters.
Covid-19 is a very harmful and deadly disease that spreads when droplets of saliva
come into contact with the face of another person as by a cough, sneeze, or just by
speaking too closely.97 As a consequence, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) recommends that people limit themselves from being in public,
except when absolutely necessary, such as when a person needs to buy groceries, see
a doctor, or work in an “essential” industry. The CDC also recommends wearing
facemasks made of cloth when in public and engaging in social distancing of at least
six feet.98 Because the disease is so prevalent and so deadly (especially for older
people; people with chronic health conditions like diabetes, asthma, or serious
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(last visited May 7, 2020).
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respiratory illnesses;99 and some children100), and because it is easily spread by simply
being in close proximity to another person where precautions are either not available
or not undertaken, the government has a compelling interest in imposing restrictions
on what otherwise would be a private right to travel and visit with other people. The
restrictions are compelling insofar as they are the minimum necessary to provide
protection for individual autonomy against a disease that, if left alone, would cause
loss of life or otherwise seriously impair victims’ well-being. Of this concern there
is little doubt. Consequently, it should not be surprising that governments will seek
to gather information on individual behavior from all sources, including private sector
data banks. However, the fact that the government has a compelling interest does not
mean that it is free to impose any restrictions it pleases, nor to use the information
obtained for purposes unrelated to preventing the spread of the disease.
The way privacy operates where a compelling state interest overrides a right
to privacy is to have privacy provide the regulatory standard against which the
maximum amount of intrusion on the right is the minimum necessary to achieve the
government’s compelling interest.101 Where to draw the line on what is minimally
necessary in the Covid-19 case may be legitimately debated among medical experts,
especially as it bears, for example, on what kinds of tests or restrictions are best to
detect and prevent the virus from spreading.102 The standard proposed here is the
minimum necessary to achieve the government’s compelling interest to protect
against loss of life or serious physical harm. But how is this standard to be assessed?
One of the means the government uses to protect against the spread of the virus is to
99
George Citroner, Here’s What Older At-Risk People Should Know About the Coronavirus, HEALTHLINE
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/what-older-people-with-chronic-conditions-need-toknow-about-covid-19.
100
Perri Klass, Rethinking Covid-19 in Children, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020),
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See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 115. This standard has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States in regard to racial classifications in public university admissions programs under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause that are justified by a compelling state interest. In Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003), for example, the Court stated: “As we have explained, whenever the government
treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within
the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.” But that observation
says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the
court applying strict scrutiny. When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.
Id. (citations omitted). In Grutter, the compelling interest was to ensure student body diversity in an educational
environment, which at the time, and probably for a generation, thereafter, would not have been possible without
an admissions procedure that considered race as one of several admissions factors. Recall Justice O’Connor’s
comment at the end of her majority opinion: “The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have
a termination point ‘assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.’” Id. at 342
(citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)). Similarly, in regard to Covid-19, the
compelling interest that in some circumstances justifies overriding privacy is preservation of autonomy, the end
and ground of privacy itself.
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See Madeline Johnson, Experts Debate Whether Point of Care COVID-19 Testing Can Help Flatten the
Curve, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/clinical/experts-debatewhether-point-care-covid-19-testing-can-help-flatten-curve.
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require in most states that, at various stages of the pandemic, individuals will need to
“shelter in place,” meaning not leave their residences to go to work or school, but
only leave to go grocery shopping, see a doctor, or perform a state-recognized
essential service.103 Needless to say, this has had a great short-term effect on the
economy, leading to millions of lost jobs.104 And this itself raises an intriguing
question: how much loss of life or threat of serious infection needs to be present in
order for the government to restrict these activities? The formula described above is
based on individual rights, not on a utilitarian calculation of how much death is
acceptable. Still, does that mean the government is free to restrict any activity, even
where loss of life or the threat of serious infections are minimal? Can it even be
known for sure how much loss of life or how many serious infections are likely to
occur? I do not rest this matter just on an appeal to the limitations of our current
knowledge, even less on some kind of utilitarian calculation.
Part of the problem here is that any model developed to serve the public
interest will necessarily be inductive.105 That is to say, it will draw together
probabilities of various events occurring, including accidents to the extent they can
be predicted, to determine the probability of predicted results. As a consequence, no
model based on human behavior or even just the behavior of physical phenomena will
ever be 100% certain. The most it will ever be able to produce is a reasonable
prediction of what is likely to happen, if all the conditions specified come about.106
In the case of Covid-19, many, but not all, of these conditions will involve how
carefully human beings follow CDC and other appropriate medical advice. (I say
“not all” because there could be other factors in the environment, including in the way
the virus itself gets transmitted, that are, as yet, unknown.) Still, such models offer a
reasonable basis for limiting governmental regulation to only what appears needed to
effectively respond to the crisis. This is not a backdoor to some kind of utilitarian
calculation of how many deaths may be acceptable, but a substantive ground for
determining reasonableness in protecting individual autonomy by establishing a
criterion for when a restriction is the minimum necessary to further the government’s
compelling interest. Consequently, if the current standards set for preventing
infections are likely to protect human autonomy, assuming everything works as
103
See Sarah Mervosh et al., Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html.
104
See Brian Menickella, Covid-19 Worldwide: The Pandemic’s Impact on the Economy and Markets,
FORBES (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmenickella/2020/04/08/covid-19-worldwide-thepandemics-impact-on-the-economy-and-markets/#12e2de6f28c3. See also COVID-19: Impact Could Cause
Equivalent of 195 Million Job Losses, Says ILO Chief, UN NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061322. In the United States, the number of people unemployed is over
twenty million as of April 16, 2020. Lucia Mutikani, Coronavirus: Over 20 Million Americans Have Now
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Unemployment
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WORLD
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FORUM
(Apr.
16,
2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/united-states-unemployment-claimants-coronavirus-covid19/.
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(2003),
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predicted, and if additional restrictions are not deemed necessary, unless chosen at
the individual level, then the government’s imposition of these standards is narrowly
drawn for present purposes. And should further restrictions be needed in the future
or should existing restrictions be justifiably lessened (because the viral spread comes
under control), then the fact that privacy remains a regulatory standard should call
attention to making these further adjustments.
A related matter is very important because it has been seriously affected by
the Covid-19 pandemic. This is the right to engage in productive labor as a type of
private action.107 There is a serious disagreement among those who are unemployed:
some consider it dangerous to return to work too early, while others wish to return to
work right away to be able to continue to survive financially.108 For reasons already
identified, the state’s concern to protect against the spread of the Covid-19 virus
satisfies being a compelling interest for restricting going back to work too soon. What
may not be satisfied is the further requirement that the interest be narrowly drawn so
to not unnecessarily overburden the economic context in which shelter-in-place
orders operate.

107
The right to productive labor has not been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
where it has been recognized, for example, by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, it was recognized
to support a state statute that allows workers in union-shops to opt out of having to pay union dues in return for
continued employment. See Steven Alan Adams, State Supreme Court Upholds Right to Work Law After FiveYear Long Court Battle, THE PARKERSBURG NEWS AND SENTINEL (May 7, 2020),
https://www.newsandsentinel.com/news/local-news/2020/04/state-supreme-court-upholds-right-to-work-lawafter-five-year-long-court-battle/. This is not the sense of the right being discussed here. For my purposes, I am
considering the right to work as a privacy right that the state should not interfere with absent a compelling
interest. Such a right fits the definition of a private act and fits the idea of a human right as described by Professor
Alan Gewirth:
The right to employment is both a negative and a positive right. It is a negative right
in that all other persons and groups have the correlative duty, consistent with moral
requirements of the principle of human rights, to refrain from interfering with an agent’s
obtaining, performing, or retaining productive and remunerative work. This duty to
refrain includes the duty not to impose obstacles that prevent persons from working
because of considerations of race, religion, gender, or other criteria that are irrelevant to
the ability to perform the kind of work that is in question. It also includes the duty not to
exclude persons from jobs, or fire them from jobs they already have, because they have
objected to their work conditions on grounds of health or safety.
ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 217–18 (1996). This right does not, however, prohibit
union membership because of the serious unequal bargaining position between the worker and the
employer. With regard to the way this right to work has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, it is worth taking note of Gewirth’s further comment that:
The negative right to work receives a further interpretation wherein its correlative respondents
or duty-bearers are labor unions. This interpretation is used by employers who object to having union
membership made a condition of employment. The inequalities of power [between management and
labor], however, make this interpretation of the right morally unacceptable.
Id. at 218.
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See Quint Forgey, Poll: Large Majority of Americans Think it’s More Important to Stay Home than
Return to Work: Only 30 Percent of Respondents Think the Top National Priority Should be to Get the Economy
Up and Running Again, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/23/poll-majorityamericans-important-to-stay-home-than-return-to-work-203427.
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In a capitalist society, personal survival is usually dependent on being able
and willing to engage in productive labor.109 Consequently, if such labor is absent,
because of a shelter in place order, the very concern that supports imposing a
compelling interest to not go to work, namely, support of personal autonomy, now
works the other way. The minimum intrusion on one’s privacy right to work obliges
the state in these circumstances to provide, where possible, the means for remaining
healthy and financially secure during the shelter-in-place period. Thus, the
government violates individual autonomy when it legitimately imposes a shelter-inplace order but does not, at the same time, provide the means necessary to counter the
financial effects arising from having to follow the order by, for example, not going to
work.110 Of course, the government can only go as far to counter financial effects as
its resources allow. However, this acknowledgement of “ought implies can” should
not be a serious deterrent for a first world country, like the United States, which
presumably could draw upon a variety of different resource possibilities, including
adding to its deficit.111 This does not mean that the state has to provide the same
revenue that someone might make if they were working in a high-paying job, but
especially for low-paying jobs and jobs that cannot be performed offsite and online,
the amount of support an individual receives during a health crisis such as Covid-19
should be nearly the same as what they would have received were they at work,
including healthcare and other essential benefits.112 And although this is a matter of
legislative prerogative, nevertheless, since a fundamental right to privacy in the form
of returning to productive work is being impacted when the right to work is barred, it
would seem that this alone should impose an immediate moral and political duty on
Congress to provide all financial and health assistance within its capacity to offset the
economic and health effects of shelter-in-place orders.113
109
See Adam Hayes, Important Features of Capitalism, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040715/what-are-most-important-aspects-capitalist-system.asp.
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Kelsey Snell, What’s Inside the Senate’s $2 Trillion Coronavirus Aid Package, NPR (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/26/821457551/whats-inside-the-senate-s-2-trillion-coronavirus-aid-package.
111
Immanuel Kant describes “ought implies can” as follows: “[t]he action to which the ‘ought’ applies
must indeed be possible under natural conditions. These conditions, however, do not play any part in
determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the [field of] appearance.”
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 540 (1787). As of the time of this writing, Congress is discussing
a second stimulus bill to further offset the financial and health effects of Covid-19 following its recent support
for small businesses and testing. See Erica Werner, House Passes $484 Billion Bill with Money for Small
Businesses, Hospitals, and Testing to Prevent Coronavirus,
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/04/23/congress-coronavirus-small-business/; see also Erica
Werner, House Democrats Pass $3 Trillion Coronavirus Relief Bill Despite Trump’s Veto Threat, WASH. POST
(May
15,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/05/15/democrats-pelosi-congresscoronavirus-3-trillion-trump/. For information on the first stimulus bill, see supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
112
Although this Section of the Article focuses on privacy invasions caused by the government’s recent
efforts to protect against the spread of Covid-19, it should be assumed that much of the argument here would
also support providing financial protections for workers suffering other unexpected, non-voluntary disruptions,
including downturns in financial markets. See generally GEWIRTH, supra note 107 (providing a broader
discussion of the right to productive agency and what should be done to sustain and protect it).
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For purposes of this discussion, I ignore the fact that many shelter-in-place orders are imposed by state
governments, not the federal government, because the federal government is certainly involved in responding to
this national crisis and should be coordinating a national response. See, e.g., Sharon Parrott et al., CARES Act
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B. DEALING WITH COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTRUSIONS ON
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
So far, we have considered some ways the right to privacy limits government
intrusion on personal choices, even in the face of a global pandemic. What I now
wish to consider is how a right to privacy might limit private sector data banks from
gaining unequal access to information about personal wants and desires that might
then be used to manipulate not only sales but other personal and political choices one
might make. It has already been briefly explained in Section I how such information
might be gathered usually without knowledge of the person from whom the
information is acquired. And it was also explained how, once gathered, the
information might then be turned toward not only satisfying existing desires but
promotion of new wants and desires.114 What is particularly significant about both
uses, especially when treated in combination, is how they can be manipulated to affect
individual behavior in the targeted audience. Recall from Section III how our human
psychology allows information to affect the performance of private acts. Such
manipulations, as arise when massive amounts of personal information are directed
toward affecting behavior, raise a serious threat to personal autonomy, even when it
appears the targeted audience’s wants and desires are being satisfied, especially if
those desires are either manufactured or so narrowly routed as to blind the targeted
audience from other considerations.115 Moreover, if the private sector is left to its
own devices, such abuses will likely continue because they are also highly
profitable.116 So, what is to be done to avoid such manipulations of private
information?
Obviously, the government will need to be involved to offset the commercial
financial motivations that promote intrusions on personal privacy,117 but that may
itself become problematic, if the government wishes to use information gathered by
the private sector for its own purposes. What is needed is a way to constrain the
private sector, not so much from collecting information (provided there is not a
reasonable expectation of privacy that is being intruded upon), but from then
manipulating the data so collected to affect the behavior of private individuals and
groups. If the government is to be the guarantor of this protection, how can protection
be ensured, given the government’s own legitimate concern for sometimes having
Includes Essential Measures to Respond to Public Health, Economic Crises, but More Will Be Needed, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/cares-act-includesessential-measures-to-respond-to-public-health-economic-crises. See also Liz Alderman, Paid to Stay Home:
Europe’s Safety Net Could Ease Toll of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/business/europe-coronavirus-labor-help.html.
114
See supra Section I (discussing Galbraith).
115
See Galbraith, supra note 30, at 128–29.
116
See GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 97–98 (1999) (involving a company’s violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by selling personal information gathered from its member applications to use its website
despite having promised its members it would not disclose their information).
117
See, e.g., id.
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access to the information to protect the autonomy of all? It would appear that the
latter interest might attenuate affording too much protection to private information,
but if that is the case, where is the line to be drawn?
A good way to begin this presentation is to see first how privacy might apply
in the area of private commercial gatherings of information. It has already been stated
that privacy in the torts area encompasses seclusion and solitude, which include
interests in not having embarrassing not-newsworthy facts revealed about oneself, not
being placed in a false light, and not having one’s likeness taken for commercial
purposes without permission.118 That said, how should the commercial mechanisms
for gathering information by monitoring “posts, pictures, interactions and internet
activity in real time” be properly restricted?119 Since some of these sources are placed
in the public realm by the internet user, there cannot be a complete expectation of
privacy as to who may ultimately obtain them. For example, even if limits are placed
on one’s Facebook account so that content is shared only with friends, how friends
may further disseminate the information when using other apps cannot be
guaranteed.120
At first glance, it may appear that posting photos or information only to
friends is, like closing the shutters to one’s windows, a convention socially recognized
“that defines, protects, preserves, or guards” that information only to be shared among
the designated users.121 If so, then in the same way a peeping Tom may be sued for
violating privacy, the law should recognize a similar tort claim against those who
knowingly violate an established convention designed to protect private information
from getting disseminated broadly.122 However, this presupposes that the further
dissemination of the information is intentional. What if the information dissemination
occurs because of a benign use of apps already on one’s phone or computer?123
Additionally, should the receiver of the information bear any liability provided they
did not conspire to obtain the information by offering an inducement to the nonoriginal holder?
Particularly problematic challenges arise in the tort area when those against
whom a privacy claim is made themselves claim a First Amendment right to receive
the information.124 This will likely be the case where information is gathered (perhaps
widely) without any obvious intrusion on the seclusion or solitude of anyone else, and
118

For a discussion of the cases in this area, see supra Section II.
Zuboff, supra note 6.
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David Baser, Hard Questions: Should People Be Able to Share Their Facebook Information with Other
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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encompass. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 560 (2006) (discussing
privacy problems arising from the use of technology to increase accessibility, surveillance, and facilitate “the
gathering, processing and dissemination of information”).
123
See Emily Eposito, The Five Best Data Collection Tools in 2019: The Best Apps for Gathering Data in
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even more so if the privacy claim is directed against having merely gathered the data
from sources that appear in the public domain.125 In such circumstances, courts will
have to decide where the privacy claim leaves off and a First Amendment right begins.
This can be particularly difficult where the party who claims her privacy was intruded
upon is far removed from the actual gathering or compiling of the information. Here,
it is important to remember that autonomy can provide a justification for both the First
Amendment right to receive information as well as the individual’s privacy right to
not have personal information revealed about oneself. Still, finding a bright-line rule
to discern the boundary between these two rights will not be easy and may produce
inconsistent results depending on exactly how the information was obtained. Of
course, such a claim might be handled by a conflict of rights analysis in which
autonomy provides the common denominator to determine in a particular case which
right should dominate. But the problem there is not that such an analysis will not
work, but that it would have to be employed in possibly a great many cases where
factual differences arising from the application of different and evolving technologies
may be relevant.126 For this reason, limiting decisions in these cases to just a conflict
of rights approach or a traditional common law tort approach, even when adjusted for
First Amendment claims, may not be the most efficient way to go about resolving
these issues on a broad scale. And so, the question becomes how to best protect
individual autonomy in a way that is both consistent and uniform, but also recognizes
the legitimate interests of those seeking information as well as those seeking to keep
personal information about themselves private.
Federal legislation limiting not so much the gathering of information from
public portals but its use to affect individual behavior would seem to be the better
approach. Such legislation would avoid running afoul of the First Amendment right
to receive information by focusing only on limiting its clandestine use when directed
toward affecting private individual behavior. In other words, information gathered
about the wants and desires of various groups, even when developed along
geographical, political, or cultural lines, could still be obtained, provided the
information was not obtained illegally, was primarily commercial in nature, and was
not specifically directed to affecting any particular individual user’s behavior without
their knowledge. This limitation, however, would not apply if the source (or its wellidentified affiliate) had been approached by the ultimate user to gain information
125
See Gathering Private Information, DIGIT. MEDIA L. PROJECT (May 22,
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/gathering-private-information.
126
It has been noted that:
[R]ecent advances in information technology threaten privacy and have reduced the
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consequences as a result of access to personal data. In the second half of the 20th century
data protection regimes have been put in place as a response to increasing levels of
processing of personal data. The 21st century has become the century of big data and
advanced information technology (e.g. forms of deep learning), the rise of big tech
companies and the platform economy, which comes with the storage and processing of
exabytes of data.
Privacy and Information Technology, STANFORD ENCYC. OF TECH. (Oct. 30,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/.
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about oneself, as, for example, in obtaining a credit report.127 Because this is an area
of commercial speech, legal restrictions on information dissemination (especially
where it is likely to be directed at affecting individual behavior) are fought with less
concern for protecting autonomy generally than would be the case if the information
disseminated was, for example, political in nature. Indeed, restrictions on commercial
speech usually invoke only an inquiry as to whether the “governmental interest is
substantial” and “not more than necessary to service that interest.”128
Such a statute, as I am suggesting here, should pass constitutional muster
when challenged on the basis of this First Amendment commercial speech test, since
protection of private information certainly constitutes a substantial governmental
interest, provided the intrusion is narrowly drawn to not bar a commercial advertiser
or marketer from gaining legitimate access to publicly available consumer
information. Where the issue becomes more complex is when the information
gathered in a general data bank is used to promote not commercial but specifically
political advertising.129 In that instance, the limitation set out by the statute would, of
course, need to be justified as serving a stronger, perhaps compelling interest of the
state, as well as being narrowly drawn, because such information is often associated
with becoming a knowledgeable voter.130 But presumably, this higher scrutiny test
could be satisfied by further showing how advances in the technology of gathering
and compiling information have undermined the very autonomy the First Amendment
itself is designed to protect. That is to say, while previously a governmental unit may
not substitute its view as to which solicitations a householder may wish to receive, it
127

See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). There, the Supreme
Court, per Justice Powell, set out a lesser standard from strict scrutiny for when the government may restrict
commercial speech. According to Justice Powell, that lesser standard
must [first] determine whether the expression is [even] protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
129
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could nevertheless “punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously
expressed will of the occupant.”131 Technology has now transformed this previous
First Amendment test so that persons operating computers and using the internet,
which are now used in the regular course of living,132 cannot just put out a nosolicitation sign to those sending information the person does not desire or want to
receive, and even attempts to “unsubscribe,” after the fact, are not always very
successful.133 What a federal statute might do in such a circumstance to protect the
internet user’s privacy would be first to create a national “Do Not Solicit” registry,
analogous to the National Do Not Call Registry that puts telemarketers on notice that
the user does not wish to be bothered.134 Beyond this, Congress could adopt a statute
empowering the Federal Trade Commission to more broadly regulate the data
collection industry (and especially the nine largest brokers of information) to ensure
their data collection will not affect individual autonomy. One way for Congress to
do this might be to codify the following FTC recommendations regarding data
collection and its use, since that would allow a line to be drawn where data brokers’
gathering and use of information ends and consumer privacy begins.
For data brokers that provide marketing products, Congress should
consider legislation to:
● Centralized Portal. Require the creation of a centralized
mechanism, such as an Internet portal, where data brokers can
identify themselves, describe their information collection and use
practices, and provide links to access tools and opt- outs;
● Access. Require data brokers to give consumers access to their data,
including any sensitive data, at a reasonable level of detail;
● Opt-Outs. Require opt-out tools, that is, a way for consumers to
suppress the use of their data;
● Inferences. Require data brokers to tell consumers that they derive
certain inferences from raw data;
● Data Sources. Require data brokers to disclose the names and/or
categories of their data sources, to enable consumers to correct
wrong information with an original source;
● Notice and Choice. Require consumer-facing entities—such as
retailers—to provide prominent notice to consumers when they
131
Martin v. Shutters, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1948) (involving conviction of a member of the Jehovah
Witnesses for delivering a leaflet to the inhabitant of a home in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting any
such solicitation). See also Barr v. American Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) (holding
that the robocall restriction of the Telephone Communications Act of 1981 is unconstitutional, but only the
exception for calls to collect on a debt owed the government, as a content-based exception, in violation of the
First Amendment).
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Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26,
2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/.
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Eric Griffith, How to Unsubscribe from Unwanted Email, PCMAG (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-unsubscribe-from-unwanted-email.
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See, e.g., Do Not Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–6155 (2008)).
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share information with data brokers, along with the ability to optout of such sharing; and
Sensitive Data. Further protect sensitive information, including
health information, by requiring retailers and other consumer-facing
entities to obtain affirmative express consent from consumers before
such information is collected and shared with data brokers.

For brokers that provide “risk mitigation” products, legislation
should:
● When a company uses a data broker’s risk mitigation product to
limit a consumers’ ability to complete a transaction, require the
consumer-facing company to tell consumers which data broker’s
information the company relied on;
● Require the data broker to allow consumer access to the information
used and the ability to correct it, as appropriate.
For brokers that provide “people search” products, legislation
should:
● Require data brokers to allow consumers to access their own
information, opt-out of having the information included in a people
search product, disclose the original sources of the information so
consumers can correct it, and disclose any limitations of an opt-out
feature.135
It needs to be emphasized that the above protections do not prevent the mere
gathering of consumer information; all that is being prevented is publication of the
personal information that has been gathered and its use to affect behavior, usually
without the knowledge of the person whom the information is about. This it does by
requiring, before any personal information about a person is shared, and especially
where the information may be used to affect that person’s market behavior, that the
information be made known to the person about whom it is about and the person be
given an opportunity to opt-out from any further sharing or use. Such conventions as
these operate less to warn of information that may be private, as would be the case in
the traditional torts area, and more to reassert the information’s status as private after
it is acquired. Still, the conventions are ideal for handling information that may have
been gathered without a direct intrusion on the seclusion or solitude of the targeted
individual or where the targeted individual would have otherwise had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Because the area is technologically complex, the details of
how exactly such restrictions might operate is perhaps best left for a congressional
committee, taking testimony from experts and then drafting a statute to empower and
endorse the FTC’s rulemaking authority to regulate the industry. Following this
135
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3. The recommended restriction for “Sensitive Data,” including
health information, is likely to be seen as content-based but of sufficiently high enough privacy importance as
to be justified by a compelling state interest. Id.
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approach would also leave open the door for further regulations by the FTC, as
needed, to meet future challenges resulting from new technologies yet to be devised.
Certainly, such an approach would ensure greater consistency in this area of the law
than just leaving such matters to the courts to be decided de novo after hearing cases.
Before concluding, some more specific attention should be paid to the
government’s current and future uses of data gathered on individuals by the private
sector in fighting Covid-19. Earlier it was suggested that some state governments,
and perhaps the federal government, are inclined to use data gathered from the private
sector to try and track the spread of Covid-19.136 Here the question arises whether
the state’s interest in obtaining information from data brokers will likely result in a
relaxation of the aforementioned conditions to protect the privacy of individuals.
In order to evaluate the state’s use in this context, it is first necessary to
classify the data being used and then to specify exactly how the state intends to use
the information. Arguably, since the data contained in these data banks includes
highly personal information, certain uses (like to determine political party affiliation
or willingness to engage in legal protests) need to be subject to the most exacting
scrutiny (depending on the reason for the use), and the state will need to show a
compelling interest that is narrowly drawn to gain access to the information.137
However, if the state is only seeking to identify patterns of behavior leading to
transmission of the disease without seeking to further identify other aspects of the
particular individuals or groups to be screened, heightened scrutiny should be enough,
and the state should only need to provide an important reason for its use.138 Certainly,
such an important use would be shown in trying to identify patterns of behavior that
likely lead to transmission of the virus, such as public congregation on beaches or in
parks. The fact that the state might also use this information to determine where it
needs to provide greater policing to prohibit congregations of people should not alter
this conclusion. Obviously, if the state were to go further by trying to use the
information gathered in a criminal proceeding, such a use ought to require that the
usual Fourth Amendment standard be met, namely, that the state first obtain a warrant
from a judge after providing sufficient facts to suggest that there exists probable cause
of criminal activity.139 Even provided these concerns are followed and their
136
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corresponding restrictions implemented, there may still be reason for concern that the
state’s interest in gaining access to private data banks will unduly attenuate the
necessary privacy restrictions that need to be put in place for people to feel free to
perform private actions. But perhaps the best approach here, where information on
how the material is used is still developing, is to be watchful for uses that seem less
justified and to be ready to challenge them in both the courts and public arena.
A related problem to anticipate is where the executive branch of the federal
government might actually encourage data brokers not to lose interest in developing
banks of information by itself becoming the primary consumer for such information.
This might occur if it were thought that the information gathering was necessary to
avert an existing or even future crisis. Alternatively, the various departments of the
executive branch might seek to create their own data banks of personal information
on U.S. citizens beyond what is constitutionally allowed.140
Here I believe the private-public separation can provide some safeguard, but
only if the private sector is willing to uphold its interest in not having the government
compete in creating unrestricted data banks of information. In regard to the federal
government, the way this might work would be if public interest groups, like the
American Civil Liberties Union, challenged any such attempt at information
gathering by the government as raising a separation of powers issue when not
approved by Congress. Private industry might also challenge such an effort by the
government arguing that a diminution of a property interest under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause is likely to occur, if such an action were perceived to
undermine user confidence in how private information gathered is being used.141
Additionally, private nonprofits, acting on behalf of the public, could launch a
140
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political campaign against the government having too easy access to highly personal
information, analogous to what they did with regard to the reauthorization of the
PATRIOT Act in 2011.142 These different approaches support individual autonomy
even if they are not directly grounded in autonomy. For they continue both politically
and legally the kinds of approaches that are most likely to advance greater protection
of information privacy into the future. All this goes to suggest only that while
government’s involvement with private data brokers may not be an easy connection
to sever, still, the possibility of its severance is not improbable, provided the public
remains vigilant of individual autonomy and determined in its willingness to protect
personal privacy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to give further recognition to some of the difficult
privacy issues that have arisen in the U.S. by large private sector data brokers being
able to create wide-ranging, unrestricted banks of highly personal information on U.S.
consumers. It has also sought to raise concerns over how some state governments
(and maybe the federal government) are seeking to access this information to halt the
spread of the deadly Covid-19 disease. These problems do not arise in a vacuum but
arise in the context of our various human interactions with technology and our
willingness to protect our own individual autonomy in the process.
The history of the law of privacy, as it has developed in the Fourth
Amendment, tort, and constitutional areas, combined with a theory of privacy’s
meaning and justification, can provide the needed tools for preventing the most
egregious invasions of personal information, provided the institutions of our
democracy are willing to afford these tools their necessary attention. But in the end,
this will depend on how attentive the public is to make sure privacy protections
remain in place and are sufficient to meet the challenges of our ever-evolving,
technologically advancing society. The tools themselves open up avenues that
Congress and state legislatures can take, but those will only be as good in how well
they protect individual privacy and autonomy as the public demands. What is of
upmost importance now, especially as the government becomes more involved in
gathering personal information to fight off a deadly disease, is to not lose our way by
failing to protect individual autonomy, but instead to remain vigilant in guarding the
protection of private acts, as well as private information and states of affairs, so they
do not get lost in the struggle for how best to protect society.
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